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Optimal Deferred Life Annuities to Minimize the
Probability of Lifetime Ruin ∗
Erhan Bayraktar †‡ Virginia R. Young §
Abstract
We find the minimum probability of lifetime ruin of an investor who can invest in
a market with a risky and a riskless asset and who can purchase a deferred annuity.
Although we let the admissible set of strategies of annuity purchasing process to be the
set of increasing adapted processes, we find that the individual will not buy a deferred
life annuity unless she can cover all her consumption via the annuity and have enough
wealth left over to sustain her until the end of the deferral period.
Key words. Life annuities, retirement, optimal investment, stochastic control, free-
boundary problem
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the problem of investing in a risky financial market and buying de-
ferred life annuities to minimize the probability of wealth reaching zero before dying, the
so-called probability of lifetime ruin. Although life annuities provide income security in re-
tirement, very few retirees choose a life annuity over a lump sum. For example, in a recent
comprehensive Health and Retirement Survey, only 1.57% of the respondents reported an-
nuity income; similarly, only 8.0% of respondents with a defined contribution pension plan
selected an annuity payout. For a further discussion on the thinness of the annuity market
see Milevsky and Young (2006) and the references therein.
In a well-cited paper from the public economics literature, Yaari (1965) proved that in
the absence of bequest motives – and in a deterministic financial economy – consumers will
annuitize all of their liquid wealth. Richard (1952) generalized this result to a stochastic
environment, and recently T. Davidoff and Diamond (2005) demonstrated the robustness of
Yaari’s result. The common theme of this research is the assumption of a rational expected
utility-maximizing economic agent. While this von-Neumann-Morgenstern framework is the
basis of most investment and consumption strategies studied in mathematical finance, it is
∗We thank S. David Promislow for helpful conversations concerning this project.
†Department of Mathematics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, email: erhan@umich.edu
‡E. Bayraktar is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant DMS-0604491.
§Department of Mathematics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48109,
email:vryoung@umich.edu
1
perhaps difficult to apply as a tool for normative advice because of the subjectiveness of the
individual’s utility function.
Recently, a variety of papers in the risk and portfolio management literature have reintro-
duced the Roy (1952) Safety-First rule and applied the concept to probability maximization
of achieving certain investment goals. For example, Browne (1995) derived the optimal dy-
namic strategy for a portfolio manager who is interested in minimizing the probability of
shortfall. Milevsky and Robinson (2000) introduced the probability of lifetime ruin as a risk-
metric for retirees, albeit in a static environment. As an extension of that work, Young
(2004) determined the optimal dynamic investment policy for an individual who consumes at
a specific rate, who invests in a complete financial market, and who does not buy annuities.
In work related to this paper, Milevsky et al. (2006) extended Young (2004) by allowing the
individual to buy immediate life annuities. They showed that the individual will not buy
any amount of annuity income unless she can cover all of her consumption. In this paper, we
extend Young (2004) by allowing the individual to buy deferred life annuities.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the financial market in
which the individual can invest her wealth. We also present a motivating example to demon-
strate the individual’s myopia when presented with the opportunity to buy an immediate
life annuity. In addition to investing in a risky asset, in Section 3, we allow the individual
to purchase deferred life annuities but not immediate annuities. The individual’s goal is to
minimize her probability of lifetime ruin, and we prove a verification lemma for this mini-
mal probability. It turns out that the individual exhibits the same myopia as witnessed in
Milevsky et al. (2006) and in the simple example in Section 2. Namely, she will not purchase
any deferred annuities until she can purchase an annuity that will cover all her consumption
with enough wealth remaining so that she will not ruin before the end of the deferral period.
In Section 4, we present a related optimal stopping problem. We show that the Legendre
transform of the value function of that stopping problem equals the minimal probability of
lifetime ruin. Because the value function of the optimal stopping problem solves a linear
variational inequality, one can use methods from pricing American options to determine that
value function. Then, one can take its Legendre transform to obtain the minimal probability
of lifetime ruin. We demonstrate this method via a numerical example in Section 5. We
conclude in Section 6.
2 Minimizing the Probability of Lifetime Ruin
In this section, we describe the financial market in which the individual can invest her wealth,
and we formulate the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin in this market.
Then, we allow the individual to purchase an immediate life annuity at one point in time.
We show that the individual will not do so unless she has enough money to buy an annuity
that will cover all her consumption, even if she is not allowed to buy annuities at any time
thereafter.
2
2.1 Financial model
We consider an individual aged with future lifetime described by the random variable τd.
Suppose τd is an exponential random variable with parameter λ
S , also referred to as the
force of mortality or hazard rate; in particular, E[τd] = 1/λ
S . The superscript S indicates
that the parameter equals the individual’s subjective belief as to the value of her hazard rate.
We assume that the individual consumes wealth at a constant net rate of c; this rate
might be given in real or nominal units. We say that the rate c is a net rate because it is her
rate of consumption offset by any current income she receives. One can interpret c as the
minimum net consumption level below which the individual cannot (or will not) reduce her
consumption further; therefore, the minimum probability of lifetime ruin that we compute
gives a lower bound for the probability of ruin under any consumption function bounded
below by c.
The individual can invest in a riskless asset, which earns interest at the rate r ≥ 0. Also,
she can invest in a risky asset whose price satisfies
dSt = µStdt+ σStdBt, S0 = S > 0, (2.1)
in which µ > r, σ > 0, and B is a standard Brownian motion with respect to a filtration
F = {Ft} of a probability space (Ω,F ,P). We assume that B is independent of τd, the
random time of death of the individual. If c is given as a real rate of consumption (that is,
after inflation), then we express r and µ as real rates.
Let pit denote the amount invested in the risky asset at time t, and let pi denote the
investment strategy {pit}t≥0. We say that a strategy pi is admissible if the process pi is
adapted to the filtration F and if pi satisfies the condition
∫ t
0 pi
2
s ds <∞, almost surely, for all
t ≥ 0. The wealth dynamics of the individual for a given admissible strategy pi are given by
dWt = [rWt + (µ− r)pit − c]dt+ σpitdBt, W0 = w ≥ 0. (2.2)
By “lifetime ruin,” we mean that the individual’s wealth reaches the value 0 before she
dies. Instead, one could define ruin as reaching some non-zero value b before dying, in which
b could represent assets below which an individual qualifies for social assistance or considers
herself impoverished. Alternatively, b could represent a minimum bequest amount that the
individual wants to leave her heirs. For simplicity, we take the ruin level to be b = 0. Note
that 0 is, then, the absorbing boundary of the wealth process W so that if wealth reaches 0,
then the wealth process is “killed” and the game is over.
In this simple (time-homogeneous) setting, denote the minimum probability that the
individual outlives her wealth by φ(w; c), given that the individual is alive, in which one
minimizes the probability of ruin over admissible investment strategies. The argument w
indicates that one conditions the ruin probability on the individual possessing wealth w the
current time, and we explicitly represent the rate of consumption c in this ruin probability.
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Young (2004) explicitly determines that φ is given by
φ(w; c) =
(
1−
rw
c
)d
for 0 ≤ w ≤
c
r
, in which (2.3)
d =
1
2r
[
(r + λS +m) +
√
(r + λS +m)2 − 4rλS
]
> 1 and (2.4)
m =
1
2
(
µ− r
σ
)2
. (2.5)
Also, Young (2004) shows that the optimal investment strategy {pi∗} is given in feedback
form. Specifically, pi∗t = pi
∗(W ∗t ), in which W
∗ is the optimally-controlled wealth, and in
which pi∗ is given by
pi∗(w; c) =
µ− r
σ2
c− rw
(d− 1)r
for 0 ≤ w ≤
c
r
. (2.6)
For w ≥ c/r, any investment strategy is optimal if at least c/r is invested in the riskless asset,
so that at least c is produced as continuous income risklessly.
2.2 One-time purchase of an immediate life annuity
Milevsky et al. (2006) show that if one introduces immediate life annuities into the model
given in Section 2.1, then the individual will not buy an immediate life annuity until her
wealth is large enough to cover all her consumption. We demonstrate a similar phenomenon
in this section.
Suppose that an individual can buy an immediate life annuity at one point in time, say
now. Assume that the price of a life annuity that pays $1 per year continuously is given by
∫ ∞
0
e−rse−λ
Os ds =
1
ρ
, (2.7)
in which ρ , r + λO, and λO > 0 is the constant objective hazard rate that is used to price
annuities.
Suppose w ≥ c/ρ; then, it is optimal for the individual to spend c/ρ to buy an immediate
annuity that will pay at the continuous rate c for the rest of her life. In this case, the
individual will not ruin, under the convention that if her net consumption rate becomes 0,
then she is not considered ruined even if her wealth is 0. (The latter occurs if w = c/ρ
immediately before buying the annuity.)
Next, suppose w < c/ρ, and suppose the individual spends ∆c/ρ on an immediate annuity
so that her net consumption become c − ∆c. After buying the annuity, the probability of
ruin equals φ(w −∆c/ρ; c −∆c), in which φ is given by (2.3). Because φ is given explicitly,
one can use elementary calculus to show that φ(w−∆c/ρ; c−∆c) is strictly increasing with
respect to ∆c for ∆c ∈ (0, wρ). Therefore, the optimal amount of immediate annuity income
for the individual to buy is 0. In other words, if the individual cannot completely eliminate
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her probability of ruin, then she will not buy any amount of immediate annuity. She does
not want to relinquish the ability to trade flexibly between the riskless and risky assets, even
though the riskless return r < ρ = r + λO.
Note that the individual exhibits surprising myopia in her decision not to buy an imme-
diate annuity. It is surprising because the life annuity offers the riskless rate of ρ > r. After
this one-time opportunity to buy an immediate life annuity, she will only be able to lock into
the riskless rate r < ρ. If her wealth is less than c/ρ, then she gives up this chance to buy an
immediate annuity because by doing so, she would increase her probability of lifetime ruin.
In what follows, we observe a similar behavior when it comes to buying deferred life
annuities. Namely, the individual will not buy a deferred life annuity unless she can cover all
her consumption via the annuity and have enough wealth left over to sustain her risklessly
until the end of the deferral period.
3 Deferred Life Annuities
In this section and in the remainder of the paper, we consider the problem of minimizing the
probability of lifetime ruin when the individual can purchase deferred annuities, in addition
to investing in riskless and risky assets.
3.1 Probability of lifetime ruin
At time t, the individual can buy a deferred life annuity that pays at a continuous rate and
begins at a fixed time T > t, if she is alive then, and that continues until she dies. Here one
might take T as the retirement time of the individual. The value of this deferred life annuity
that pays $1 per year continuously is given by
a¯(t) =
∫ ∞
T
e−r(s−t)e−λ
O(s−t)ds =
1
ρ
e−ρ(T−t), (3.1)
in which ρ = r + λO, as in (2.7). Before and after time T , the individual can invest in the
riskless and risky assets described in Section 2.
Let As denote the cumulative amount of deferred annuity income that will begin at time
T , purchased at or before time s, and let pis denote the amount invested in risky asset at time
s, as in Section 2. Let A denote the annuity-purchasing strategy {As}s∈[t,T ). We say that a
strategy (A, pi) is admissible if the non-decreasing process A is adapted to the filtration F; if
As ∈ [0, c] for s ∈ [t, T ); and if pi is admissible as defined in Section 2.
Note that it is not optimal for an individual to spend wealth now to cover more than the
consumption rate c. Also, if the individual were to be in the fortunate position of receiving
A ≥ c of deferred income at time T either through prior purchases of deferred annuities or
through pension income, then the effect would be as if A were equal to c. It follows that it
is not a restriction to require that A satisfy 0 ≤ At ≤ c for all t ∈ [0, T ).
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Denote the set of admissible strategies by A. The wealth dynamics of the individual for
a given strategy (A, pi) ∈ A are given by
dWs =

[rWs− + (µ − r)pis− − c]ds + σpis−dBs − a¯(s)dAs, t < s < T,[rWs + (µ − r)pis +AT − c]ds+ σpisdBs, s > T, (3.2)
where Wt = w ≥ 0, At = A ∈ [0, c].
In this setting, denote the minimum probability that the individual outlives her wealth
by ψ(w,A, t), given that the individual is alive at time t. The arguments w, A, and t indicate
that one conditions the ruin probability on the individual possessing wealth w at time t and
on the individual receiving deferred annuity income A at time T due to purchases at or before
time t < T . Note that we also allow for the individual to possess deferred income in the form
of pension or Social Security benefits; such amounts are implicit in A.
Let τ0 denote the first time that wealth equals 0, and recall that τd denotes the random
time of death of the individual. Thus, ψ is the minimum probability that τ0 < τd, in which one
minimizes with respect to admissible investment strategies pi dynamically and with respect
to the deferred annuity benefits A. The minimum probability of ruin can be written as
ψ(w,A, t) = inf
(A,pi)∈A
P
[
τ0 < τd
∣∣At = A,Wt = w] , (3.3)
w ≥ 0, A ∈ [0, c], and t ≥ 0.
Remark 3.1 Suppose the individual purchased deferred annuities at or before time t to the
extent that her income from those annuities will be A beginning at time T . If she buys another
deferred annuity at time t that covers all of the excess consumption c − A with enough left
over to live on until time T by investing only in the riskless asset, she can avoid ruin for sure
if she is wealthy enough at time t. Next, we determine this so-called “safe level.”
If the individual begins with Wt− = w wealth, buys c − A of deferred annuity income,
consumes at a rate of c, invests all her wealth in the riskless asset at rate r, then for t < s < T,
her wealth follows
dWs = (rWs − c)ds, Wt+ = w −
c−A
ρ
e−ρ(T−t). (3.4)
It follows that
WT =
(
w −
c−A
ρ
e−ρ(T−t)
)
er(T−t) − c
er(T−t) − 1
r
. (3.5)
The safe level w = w¯(A, t) can be found by solving WT = 0, which yields
w¯(A, t) = c
1− e−r(T−t)
r
+ (c−A)
e−ρ(T−t)
ρ
, t ≤ T, A ∈ [0, c]. (3.6)
Note that we assume that if total rate of income at time T equals the rate of consumption,
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then the ruin probability is 0, even if wealth is 0 at that time.
In the following remark, we provide a useful characterization of the minimum probability
of lifetime ruin in our setting.
Remark 3.2 Recall that τ0 = inf{t > 0 :Wt = 0}. Then, because τ0 and τd are independent,
we have the following expression for ψ :
ψ(w,A, t) = inf
(A,pi)∈A
E
[∫ ∞
t
λSeλ
S(s−t) 1{t≤τ0≤s} ds
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A
]
= inf
(A,pi)∈A
E
[∫ ∞
τ0
λSeλ
S(s−t) 1{t≤τ0<∞} ds
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A
]
= inf
(A,pi)∈A
E
[
e−λ
S(τ0−t) 1{t≤τ0<∞}
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A]
= inf
(A,pi)∈A
E
[
e−λ
S(τ0−t) 1{t≤τ0≤T} + e
−λS(T−t)φ(WT ; c−AT )1{τ0>T}
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A] ,
(3.7)
in which φ is the minimum probability of ruin given in (2.3).
3.2 Verification lemma
In this section, we provide a useful inequality which allows us in Section 4 to show that if we
find a smooth solution to a given boundary-value problem, then that solution is the minimum
probability of ruin defined in (3.3).
Lemma 3.1 For any pi ∈ R, define the functional operators Lpi and L through their actions
on a test function f as
Lpif = ft + (rw − c)fw +
1
2
σ2pi2fww − λ
Sf, (3.8)
and
Lf , min
pi
Lpif = ft + (rw − c)fw −m
f2w
fww
− λSf. (3.9)
Note that the second equality is satisfied if fww > 0. Let v = v(w,A, t) be a non-increasing
convex function of w that is twice-differentiable with respect to w, except possibly at w =
w¯(A, t) where we assume that it has right- and left-derivatives, and differentiable with respect
to A and t. Suppose v satisfies the following conditions:
1. Lpiv(w,A, s) ≥ 0,
2. a¯(s)vw(w,A, s) − vA(w,A, s) ≤ 0,
3. v(0, A, s) = 1,
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for any pi ∈ R, A ∈ [0, c], w ≥ 0, and t ≤ s < T, and
4. v(w,A, s) = ψ(w,A, s) = φ(w; c −A), s ≥ T .
Then,
v(w,A, t) ≤ ψ(w,A, t), (3.10)
for all w ≥ 0 and A ∈ [0, c].
Proof: Let τn , {s ≥ t :
∫ s
t
pi2sds ≥ n}. Define τ , τ0∧τn, which is a stopping time with
respect to the filtration F; then, by using Itoˆ’s formula for semi-martingales, we can write
e−λ
S((τ∧T )−t)v(Wτ∧T , Aτ∧T , τ ∧ T ) = v(Wt, At, t) +
∫ τ∧T
t
e−λ
S(s−t)vw(Ws, As, s)σpisdBs
+
∫ τ∧T
t
e−λ
S(s−t)Lpisv(Ws, As, s)ds−
∫ τ∧T
t
e−λ
S(s−t)vw(Ws, As, s)a¯(s)dA
(c)
s
+
∫ τ∧T
t
e−λ
S(s−t)vA(Ws, As, s)dA
(c)
s +
∑
t≤s≤τ∧T
e−λ
S(s−t) (v(Ws, As, s)− v(Ws−, As−, s−)) .
(3.11)
Here, A(c) is the continuous part of A, that is,
A
(c)
t , At −
∑
0≤s≤t
(As −As−). (3.12)
Since v is convex in w, v2w(w,A, t) ≤ v
2
w(0, A, t) for w ≥ 0. Also, any pair (A, t) belongs
to the compact set [0, c] × [0, T ]. Therefore,
E
{∫ τ∧T
t
e−2λ
S(s−t)v2w(Ws, As, s)σ
2pi2sds
∣∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A
}
<∞, (3.13)
which implies that
E
{∫ τ∧T
t
e−λ
S(s−t)vw(Ws, As, s)σpisdBs
∣∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A
}
= 0. (3.14)
By taking expectations of equation (3.11), while using (3.14) and Assumptions 1 and 2 in
the statement of the verification lemma, we obtain
E
{
e−λ
S((τ∧T )−t)v(Wτ∧T , Aτ∧T , τ ∧ T )
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A} ≥ v(w,A, t). (3.15)
In deriving (3.15), we also used the fact that
∑
t≤s≤τ∧T
e−λ
S(s−t) (v(Ws, As, s)− v(Ws−, As−, s−)) ≥ 0, (3.16)
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because Assumption 2 implies that v is non-decreasing in the direction of jumps of the state
process {Ws, As}s≥0.
An application of the dominated convergence theorem to (3.15) yields
E
{
e−λ
S((τ0∧T )−t)v(Wτ0∧T , Aτ0∧T , τ0 ∧ T )
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A} ≥ v(w,A, t). (3.17)
By using Assumptions 3 and 4, one can rewrite (3.17) as
v(w,A, t) ≤ E
{
e−λ
S(τ0−t)v(τ0, Aτ0 , τ0)1{t≤τ0≤T} + e
−λS(T−t)v(WT , AT , T )1{τ0>T}
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A}
= E
{
e−λ
S(τ0−t)1{t≤τ0≤T} + e
−λS(T−t)φ(WT ; c−AT )1{τ0>T}
∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A} .
(3.18)
This equation implies that
v(w,A, t) ≤ inf
(A,pi)∈A
E
{
e−λ
S(τ0−t)1{t≤τ0≤T} + e
−λS(T−t)φ(WT ; c−AT )1{τ0>T}
∣∣∣∣Wt = w,At = A
}
= ψ(w,A, t),
(3.19)
in which the last equality follows from Remark 3.2. Thus, we have proven (3.10). 
In the next section, we show that the minimum probability of ruin ψ is intimately related
to the solution of an optimal stopping problem.
4 Representation of ψ as a Legendre Transform of the Value
Function of an Optimal Stopping Problem
In this section, we first introduce an auxiliary optimal stopping problem and show that its
Legendre transform is equal to the minimum probability of ruin. We also show that an
individual will not purchase any deferred annuities until her wealth reaches the safe level
w¯(A, t).
4.1 A related optimal stopping problem
Consider the following “penalty function” u defined for (y, t) ∈ [0,∞) × [0, T ], for a fixed
A ∈ [0, c], by
u(y, t) , min (1, w¯(A, t)y) . (4.1)
Fix values 0 < y¯ < 1
w¯(A,t) < y0. Note that u is maximal among those functions f defined on
[0,∞) × [0, T ] that are concave in y and satisfy
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f(y¯, t) = w¯(A, t)y¯, and fy(y¯, t) = w¯(A, t), (4.2)
and
f(y0, t) = 1, and fy(y0, t) = 0. (4.3)
Define a stochastic process Y by
dYs = (λ
S − r)Ys ds+
µ− r
σ
Ys dBˆs, Yt = y > 0, (4.4)
in which Bˆ is a standard Brownian motion with respect to a filtration Fˆ = {Fˆs}s≥0 of a
probability space (Ωˆ, Fˆ , Pˆ), and consider the optimal stopping problem given by
ψˆ(y, t) = inf
τ∈St,T
Eˆ
[∫ τ
t
c e−λ
S (s−t) Ys ds+ e
−λS(τ−t)
{
1{τ<T} u(Yτ , τ) + 1{τ=T} g(YT )
} ∣∣∣∣Fˆt
]
,
(4.5)
in which St,T is the collection stopping times with respect to (Ωˆ, Fˆ , Pˆ, Fˆ) such that τ takes
values in [t, T ], and in which g is given by
g(y) =
c−A
r
y − (d− 1)
(
c−A
rd
y
) d
d−1
. (4.6)
Recall that d is given in (2.4).
One can think of this optimal stopping problem as awarding a “player” the running
penalty cYs between time t and the time of stopping τ , discounted by the probability that
the player survives to time s. At the time of stopping, the player receives the penalty u(Yτ , τ)
or g(YT ) depending on whether τ < T or τ = T , respectively, if she is alive then. Thus, the
player has to decide whether it is better to continue receiving the running penalty cYs or to
stop and take the final penalty u(Yτ , τ) or g(YT ).
Note that ψˆ is concave with respect to y. Indeed, because Y in (4.4) is given by Ys = y Hs
with
Hs = exp
(
−(r +m− λS)(s− t) +
µ− r
σ
(Bˆs − Bˆt)
)
, (4.7)
the integral in (4.5) can be written as y
∫ τ∧T
t
c e−λ
S (s−t)Hs ds. Thus, because u and g are
concave with respect to y, the expression in the expectation is concave with respect to y. It
follows that the infimum over stopping times τ ∈ St,T is concave with respect to y.
Define the continuation region by
D = {(y, t) ∈ R+ × [0, T ] : ψˆ(y, t) < u(y, t)} (4.8)
and consider its sections
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Dt = {y ∈ R
+ : ψˆ(y, t) < u(y, t)}, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.9)
By following the same line of arguments in Section 2.7 of Karatzas and Shreve (1998), one can
show that there are numbers y0(t) ≥ y¯(t) ≥ 0 (to be determined) such that Dt = (y¯(t), y0(t))
(thus, D = {(y, t) ∈ R+× [0, T ] : y¯(t) < y < y0(t)}) and that ψˆ is the unique classical solution
of the following free-boundary problem (FBP):


λSψˆ = ψˆt + (λ
S − r)yψˆy +my
2ψˆyy + cy on D,
ψˆ(y0(t), t) = 1 and ψˆ(y¯(t), t) = w¯(A, t)y¯(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
ψˆ(y, T ) = c−A
r
y − (d− 1)
(
c−A
rd
y
) d
d−1 for y ≥ 0.
(4.10)
Moreover, ψˆ is C1 across the free boundaries, that is,
ψˆy(y0(t), t) = 0 and ψˆy(y¯(t), t) = w¯(A, t), (4.11)
which can be shown by using similar arguments used in the proof of Lemma 2.7.8 in Karatzas and Shreve
(1998).
In the next section, we show that the solution of the FBP (4.10) is intimately connected
with the minimum probability of ruin.
4.2 Relation between the FBP (4.10) and the Minimum Probability of
Ruin
In this section, we show that the Legendre transform (see, for example, Karatzas and Shreve
(1998)) of the solution of the FBP (4.10) is in fact the minimum probability of ruin ψ. To this
end, note that because ψˆ in (4.5) is concave, we can define its convex dual via the Legendre
transform. We will omit the dependence on A when it is not necessary to emphasize the
dependence on this variable.
Theorem 4.1 Let
Ψ(w, t) , max
y≥0
[ψˆ(y, t)− wy]. (4.12)
for w ≥ 0 and t ∈ [0, T ], in which ψˆ is the value function of the optimal stopping problem in
(4.5). If
a¯(s)Ψw(w,A, s) −ΨA(w,A, s) ≤ 0, (4.13)
for A ∈ [0, c], w ≥ 0 and s ≥ t, or equivalently
ψˆA(y,A, t) ≥ −y a¯(t), (4.14)
for all y ≥ 0, A ∈ [0, c], and t ∈ [0, T ], then Ψ(w, t) = ψ(w, t).
11
Proof: For a given value of t ∈ [0, T ], the optimizer y∗ of (4.12) solves the equation
ψˆy(y, t) − w = 0; thus, y
∗(t) = I(w, t), in which I is the inverse of ψˆy with respect to y. It
follows that
Ψ(w, t) = ψˆ[I(w, t), t] − wI(w, t). (4.15)
Expression (4.15) implies that
Ψw(w, t) = ψˆy[I(w, t), t]Iw(w, t) − I(w, t) − wIw(w, t)
= wIw(w, t) − I(w, t) − wIw(w, t)
= −I(w, t).
(4.16)
Thus, y∗(t) = I(w, t) = −Ψw(w, t). Note that from (4.16), we have
Ψww(w, t) = −Iw(w, t) = −1/ψˆyy[I(w, t), t], (4.17)
and from (4.15), we have
Ψt(w, t) = ψˆy[I(w, t), t]It(w, t) + ψˆt[I(w, t), t] − wIt(w, t)
= wIt(w, t) + ψˆt[I(w, t), t] − wIt(w, t)
= ψˆt[I(w, t), t].
(4.18)
We proceed to find the boundary-value problem (BVP) Ψ solves given that ψˆ solves
(4.10). In the partial differential equation (PDE) for ψˆ in (4.10), let y = I(w, t) = −Ψw(w, t)
to obtain
λSψˆ[I(w, t), t] = ψˆt[I(w, t), t]+(λ
S−r)I(w, t)ψˆy[I(w, t), t]+mI
2(w, t)ψˆyy [I(w, t), t]+cI(w, t).
(4.19)
Rewrite this equation in terms of Ψ to get
λS [Ψ(w, t)−wΨw(w, t)] = Ψt(w, t)− (λ
S− r)Ψw(w, t)w+m
Ψ2w(w, t)
−Ψww(w, t)
− cΨw(w, t), (4.20)
or equivalently,
λSΨ(w, t) = Ψt(w, t) + (rw − c)Ψw(w, t) −m
Ψ2w(w, t)
Ψww(w, t)
. (4.21)
Next, consider the boundary and terminal conditions in (4.10). First, the boundary
conditions at y¯(t), namely ψˆ(y¯(t), t) = w¯(A, t)y¯(t) and ψˆy(y¯(t), t) = w¯(A, t), imply that the
corresponding dual value of w is w¯(A, t) and that
Ψ(w¯(A, t), t) = 0. (4.22)
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Similarly, the boundary conditions at y = y0(t), namely ψˆ(y0(t), t) = 1 and ψˆy(y0(t), t) = 0,
imply that the corresponding dual value of w is 0 and that
Ψ(0, t) = 1. (4.23)
Finally, if we compute the Legendre transform of the terminal condition in (4.10), namely
ψˆ(y, T ) = c−A
r
y − (d− 1)
(
c−A
rd
y
) d
d−1 , via the expression in (4.12), then we obtain
Ψ(w,A, T ) =
(
c−A− rw
c−A
)d
. (4.24)
Thus, we have shown that the Legendre transform Ψ of the solution of the optimal
stopping problem ψˆ (4.5), or equivalently of the FBP (4.10), is the solution of the BVP
(4.21)-(4.24). Next, we want to show that Ψ equals the minimum probability of ruin ψ
defined in (3.3). To this end, consider the following deferred annuitization strategy A: The
individual buys no (additional) deferred annuity income until her wealth reaches the safe level;
at that time, the individual buys a deferred life annuity to cover her remaining consumption
c−A and has enough wealth to sustain her until time T by investing her wealth in the riskless
asset. That is, if At = A, then A is given by
As = A+ (c−A)1{s=τw¯}, s ∈ [t, T ), (4.25)
in which
τw¯ , inf{s ∈ [t, T ) : Ws ≥ w¯(As, s)}. (4.26)
Now, because Ψ is the solution of the BVP (4.21)-(4.24), it follows that
Ψ(w,A, t) = inf
pi
P
[
τ0 < τd
∣∣At = A,Wt = w] , (4.27)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , in which the infimum is taken over all admissible investment strategies pi and
in which the individual follows the deferred annuitization strategy A defined above.
Since Ψ is the solution of (4.21)-(4.24), it follows from Lemma 3.1 that when assumption
(4.13) is satisfied we have that
Ψ(w,A, t) ≤ ψ(w,A, t) for all w ≥ 0 and A ∈ [0, c]. (4.28)
But the last inequality together with (4.27) would imply that
Ψ(w,A, t) = ψ(w,A, t) for all w ≥ 0 and A ∈ [0, c], (4.29)
and that an individual will not purchase any deferred annuities until her wealth reaches the
safe level w¯(A, t) (see (4.25)). It is clear that (4.14) is equivalent to (4.13). 
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To compute the solution of this BVP, one can apply the Projected SOR method (see,
for example, Dewynne et al. (1995)) to compute the solution of the (4.10), then apply the
expression in (4.12) to get Ψ.
5 Numerical Example
In this section, we present a numerical example to demonstrate our results. The FBP as
given is (4.10) is not readily amenable to numerical solution because the free-boundary is
unknown. However, solving the optimal stopping problem (4.5), or equivalently solving the
FBP (4.10), it is sufficient to solve the following variational inequality:


max
[
λSψˆ − ψˆt − (λ
S − r)yψˆy −my
2ψˆyy − cy, ψˆ − u
]
= 0,
ψˆ(y, T ) = c−A
r
y − (d− 1)
(
c−A
rd
y
) d
d−1 .
(5.1)
We numerically solve this variational inequality using the projected SOR method. For our
numerical example we choose the following values for the parameters of the problem:
• λS = λO = 0.02; the expected future lifetime is 50 years,
• the riskless interest rate r is 2% over inflation,
• the appreciation rate of the risky investment is µ = 6% over inflation,
• the volatility of the risky asset is 20%,
• the individual consumes c = 1.5 units of wealth per year,
• annuity income from previous investments is A = 1 units of wealth per year,
• the deferred annuity benefits start in T = 5 years.
In Figure 1 we graph the probability of ruin with and without deferred annuities, ψ(w,A, t)
and φ(w; c −A), respectively. We confirm the convexity of ψ(w,A, t) with respect to wealth
w ∈ [0, w¯(A, t)]. Next, we observe that the presence of annuities reduces the safe level from
(c − A)/r to w¯(A, t). We see that the safe level w¯(A, t) decreases with respect to time
t ∈ [0, T ], which can be confirmed by taking the derivative of (3.6). Next, we observe that
the probability of ruin ψ(w,A, t) decreases with respect to time t ∈ [0, T ]. We also observe
that the optimal investment in the risky asset
w → pi∗(w,A, t) = −
µ− r
σ2
Ψw(w,A, t)
Ψww(w,A, t)
, (5.2)
is not continuous at w = w¯(A, t), since ψw(w,A, t) < 0 for w < w¯(A, t) and ψ(w,A, t) = 0
for w > w(A, t).
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It is interesting to note that φ(w; c − A) is less than ψ(w,A, t), for wealth low enough
when t < T , because φ(w; c−A) is calculated assuming that the investor receives the benefit
A immediately, whereas ψ(w,A, t) is calculated assuming that she will receive the benefit A
at time T . In other words, an individual with low wealth prefers immediate income with no
opportunity to buy deferred annuities, instead of deferred annuity income together with an
expanded opportunity set for buying further deferred income.
We also numerically validated (4.14), from which we conclude that the investor buys a
deferred life annuity only if she has enough money to buy one to cover her excess consumption
and to consume the remainder which is invested in the riskless asset until time T without
ruining (see Remark 3.1 and Section 4.2). Then at time T , the deferred annuity will cover all
her consumption and she will avoid ruin. The qualitative properties of the probability of ruin
problem that we see in this example appear to be true for every possible range of parameters.
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Figure 1: The minimum probability of ruin in the presence of deferred annuities whose
benefits will be active at time T .
6 Summary and Conclusions
We showed that an individual will buy a deferred annuity only when her wealth reaches the
safe level w¯(A, t) given in (3.6). When wealth is lower than that amount, the individual does
not want to relinquish the ability to trade on the volatility of the risky asset, as we observed
in the simple example in Section 2.2.
One could add immediate life annuities into the financial market, as in Milevsky et al.
(2006), with the understanding that the minimum probability of ruin in this case, say ψ˜ =
ψ˜(w,A, t), is a function of wealth w at time t and deferred annuity income A purchased on or
before time t to begin at time T . Recall that we allow A to include pension or Social Security
income that will begin at time T . In this case, one would obtain a result similar to what we
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obtained in the case of deferred life annuities. Specifically, the individual would not purchase
immediate annuities before time T unless wealth were to reach the safe level w¯(A, t) given by
w¯(A, t) = min
[
A
1− e−r(T−t)
r
+ (c−A)
1
ρ
,
c
ρ
]
, t ≤ T, A ∈ [0, c], (6.1)
which is less than w¯(A, t) because ρ > r. Therefore, in the presence of immediate annuities,
an individual would never purchase deferred annuities. Perhaps our results confirm the low
level of participation in deferred annuity markets.
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